Abstract-The firewall is usually the first line of defense in ensuring network security for an organization. However, the management of firewalls has proved to be complex, error-prone, and costly for many large-networks. Manually configured firewall rules can easily contain anomalies and mistakes. Even if the rules are anomaly-free, the presence of defects in the firewall implementation, or the firewall device, may prevent the organization from getting the desired effect. To evaluate the effectiveness of firewall policy and to validate that the firewall correctly implements the rules in the policy, a thorough analysis of network traffic data is required. However, due to the magnitude of traffic log data, and the complexity of the analysis, manual evaluation is very challenging and economically infeasible. In this paper, we tackle this problem by presenting a set of algorithms that simplify this process. By analyzing only the firewall log files, we regenerate the effective firewall rules, i.e., what the firewall is really doing. By comparing this with the original manually defined rules, we can easily find if there is any anomaly in the original rule set, and also if there is any defect in the firewall implementation. In our process, we first reduce the data size by generating primitive firewall rules by mining the firewall network traffic log using packet frequencies (MLF). We then regenerate the firewall rules from the primitive rules by applying the Firewall Rule Regeneration (FRR) algorithm which uses aggregation and a set of heuristics. Our analysis also discovers the decaying rules and dominant rules, which provides information that can be used to improve the firewall filtering performance significantly. Our experiments showed that the effective firewall rules can be regenerated to a high degree of accuracy from a small amount of data. Also, since we are using only log files, and not the actual packet data, there is no risk of exposing any sensitive data.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the global world of Internet, firewall has been proved to be one of the most critical and most frequently chosen technologies in network security management. Firewall technology has already gone through several generations of innovation and research in a short period of time, and has delivered many powerful and costeffective services. Firewall controls or governs network access by allowing or denying incoming or outgoing network traffic according to some rules. Collectively, these rules are referred to as the firewall policy. These rules are explicitly written and managed to filter out unwanted traffic coming into or going out from the secure network. However, the management of firewall rules has proved to be complex, error-prone, costly, and inefficient for many large-networked organizations. Traditionally, these firewall rules are often customdesigned and hand-written by and for the human policy writer in an organization, and tailored to accommodate ever-changing business and market demands on the global Internet. Therefore, these rules are in a constant need of updating, tuning and validating to optimize firewall security. Also, as firewalls are constantly being updated, it becomes necessary to validate whether the policy is being correctly implemented by the firewall.
Although the deployment of firewall technology is the first important milestone toward securing networks, the effectiveness of firewall security may be limited or compromised by two factors -(a) poor management of firewall policy and (b) defective implementation of the firewall. The first problem is how much the rules are useful, up-todated, well-organized or efficient to reflect current characteristics and volume of network packets. For example, the network traffic trend may show that some rules are out-dated or not used recently. Cohen & Lund (2005) shows that network traffic data usually follows a strong Zipf-like distribution where majority of the traffic is handled by a small handful of rules. Identification of these rules further lead one to consider removing, aggregating or reordering of the rules to optimize the firewall policy for efficiency. Also, server and network logs may validate or confirm that firewall rules are updated and consistent with the current network services. Furthermore, the task of manuallymanaging firewall policy becomes very difficult and time-consuming, if not impossible, as the number of filtering rules increases drastically beyond the reasonable scope and scale of a manual process. This enormous task makes it necessary to have effective management of firewall security with policy management techniques and tools that enable network administrators with ease to optimize and validate firewall rules automatically. The second problem focuses on whether the firewall is implementing the policy correctly, i.e., whether it is doing what it is asked to do. Even the best policy can utterly fail to protect the network from one single implementation defect. Thus it is important to test the firewall implementation thoroughly not in the pre-release phase but also in a continuous fashion after deployment by mining the log files that it generates.
In recent years, there has been a lot of studies to detect anomalies in firewall rules. For example, Al-Shaer & Hamed (2003) and Al-Shaer & Hamed (2004) show how static analysis can reveal the anomalies in firewall rules. In addition to detection, Abedin et al. (2006) also show how to resolve the anomalies. However, these methods use static analysis on the manually defined rules, and do not use the firewall log files. Thus these methods are unable to detect any defect in the firewall implementation, for example software firewalls like Linux ipfilter, or firewall devices, for example hardware implementations in gateways or routers. Also they do not utilize the rich source of information available in the log files. The first step to bridge the gap between what is written in the firewall policy and what is being observed in the network is to analyze traffic log using trafficmining techniques. Our current research takes a new approach over the traditional and classical research in the analysis and management of the firewall policy using log files.
In this paper, we extend our previous study (Golnabi et al. 2006 ), where we presented an algorithm to generate aggregated firewall rules from log files. However, that research focused primarily on detecting anomalies in the firewall rules. This paper focuses on both anomaly detection and validation of firewall implementation. In addition, the algorithm has been overhauled to take advantage of stateful firewalls, TCP/IP connection protocols and IANA port number assignments by adding relevant heuristics generate more efficient rules. Also, the aggregation scheme has been greatly simplified. The first goal of this paper will be to demonstrate the extraction and learning of policy rules to be summarized, ordered, and generalized directly from log files without considering existing policy rules. Then by comparing the generated rules with the defined rules it is possible to verify the firewall configuration and the implementation of that configuration. As the second goal, we show that our generated rule is a timely and consistent set of firewall rules appropriate to the current network environment. The third goal will be to detect any rules which have become obsolete (decaying) or dominating with regard to network traffic over a specific time period. Since our approach works with the current log files, the generated rules will be anomaly-free and consistent with present traffic patterns, and hence reorganization of the original rules using the information from the regenerated rules will be more efficient and up-to-date. However, caution must be exercised to not introduce new anomalies in the process of reorganization. In particular, we do not recommend blindly replacing the present set of rules with the regenerated rules; rather they should be used to investigate whether the current set of rules reflect what we want, whether the firewall is doing what it is asked to do, and whether adjustments to the current set of rules will improve performance.
In this research we first take the log file of firewall and analyze it to regenerate the rules of the firewall. By doing so we come up with an anomaly free rule set. Anomalies in firewall rules can be very critical. Description of different kinds of anomalies can be found in Al-Shaer & Hamed (2003) . Existence of shadowing anomaly in a firewall log file can cause a firewall rule be shadowed and the shadowed rule will never be executed and so there will be no entry in the log file for the shadowed rule. As we generate rule from the log file, our generated rules will also not have the shadowed rule. By comparing the generated rules with the original rules, the administrator can understand about the existence of anomalies in the original rules and can take proper action to solve this anomaly. After resolving all the anomalies if there is still difference between what is configured for the firewall and what the firewall is actually doing, then there are two possibilities -either there has been insufficient data for correctly modeling the effective rules, or there must be some defect in the implementation of the firewall. Thus, our process helps the administrator to both make the rules anomaly-free and check for defects in the firewall implementation. It should be noted though that accuracy of the regenerated rules is dependent on the amount of log data available to the algorithm. However, as we found in our experiment on real firewall log file data described in Section V, it took a surprisingly small amount of data to achieve a high degree of accuracy. Our algorithm also suggests which rule is dominating or which rule is decaying by calculating the frequency of the traffic in the log file. The generated rules will not contain the rules which are never triggered by the packets and administrator can find this by comparing the generated and original rules. This information will help the administrator to reorder the firewall rules according to the real nature of the traffic and put the most dominant rules in front of the decaying rules. To regenerate the firewall rules we have done our experiment both on real data and on synthetically generated data. From the result of our algorithm we have found that we can regenerate the rule file in a small period of time with high accuracy and this will help the network administrator always keep his firewall up-todate according to the traffic pattern.
This paper is organized as follows: A summary of related works is presented in Section II. In Section III, the basic concepts related to the problem and the algorithms are discussed. In Section IV, the process of analysis of firewall rules are presented, focusing on the techniques for rule deduction, generalization and identification of decaying and dominant rules. In Section V, the results of the experiments using the Linux operating system firewall log files and synthetic generated data are illustrated. Finally in Section VI, the conclusions drawn from this research and potential areas for future work are presented.
II. RELATED WORKS
There has been a great amount of research and work in the area of firewall and policy based security management. Several models have been proposed for anomaly detection by static analysis of firewall policy. Two firewall rules are used in Al-Shaer & Hamed (2003) and Al-Shaer & Hamed (2004) to resolve rule overlapping and to compact firewall rules, but also for anomaly detection as well (e.g. Hari et al. 2000 , Lück et al. 2001 . Other approaches (e.g. Guttman 1997 , Bartal et al. 1999 propose using high level language to define rules, in order to avoid rule anomalies but turns out to be also not practical. There have been an increasing number of significant studies with emphasis on firewall rules, rule analyzers, filtering performance, tools and the related works, along with rule combination and conflict detection in filtering policies (e.g. Lee 1999 , Mahoney 2003 , Piatetsky-Shapiro 1991 , Al-Shaer & Hamed 2003 , Al-Shaer & Hamed 2004 , Fu et al. 2001 , Guttman 1997 , Eppstein & Muthukrishnan 2001 , Bartal et al. 1999 , Zwicky et al. 2000 , Ioannidis et al. 2000 , Smith & Bhattacharya 1998 , Agrawal & Srikant 1994 , Hari et al. 2000 , Hazelhurst 1999 , Lupu & Sloman 1997 , Lück et al. 2001 , Mayer et al. 2000 , Qiu et al. 2001 , Srinivasan et al. 1999 , Wack et al. 2002 , Woo 2000 , Wool 2001 , Gouda & Liu 2004 , Liu & Gouda 2008 , Yuan et al. 2006 . Static analysis of rules specifically for TCAM-based firewalls (Lakshminarayanan et al. 2005) include Meiners et al. (2009) . There has been some recent works on utilizing firewall log data for optimization purposes. Acharya et al. (2006) use data from firewall log files to reorder the rules in a way to optimize firewall performance. However their work focuses only on performance improvement and not on anomaly detection in the rules themselves, nor on firewall implementation validation.
Further there has been a significant research in policy anomaly detection area (e.g. Al-Shaer & Hamed 2003 , Al-Shaer & Hamed 2004 , Guttman 1997 . Unlike our approach, most of the current work is based on the static analysis of the existing policy configuration. Considering traffic and log mining enables to discover other important policy properties, not possible by any other approaches in general. In addition, the anomaly detection based on the mining exposes many hidden that are not detectable by analyzing only the firewall policy. For our study, we have implemented a tree-based filtering representation to detect anomaly discovery algorithm similar to the work performed in Al-Shaer & Hamed (2003) . In Al-Shaer & Hamed (2003) and Al-Shaer & Hamed (2004) , the authors developed a tool for analyzing firewall polices called Policy Advisor that has widely disseminated in academic and industrial communities. However, this tool does not also consider network traffic or device logs, thus to open up a challenge, in uncovering other critical and non-systematic anomalies such as blocking traffic to existing legitimate services, permitting or blocking traffic to non-existing services. In our previous work (Golnabi et al. 2006) , we used traffic mining technique to generate firewall rules. Then these rules were generalized via a generalization model and further an anomaly discovery algorithm was applied to the rules. In this paper, we have presented traffic data mining techniques to go beyond static analysis of these polices to discover other unrevealed misconfigurations. This uncovers any hidden or embedded anomaly that may not be detectable from the anomaly detection methods by using only the current firewall policy.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss the concepts relevant to this research. First, we discuss how a firewall works, how it is usually configured and how to obtain and analyze firewall logs. Then, we discuss the TCP handshaking protocol and how it is relevant to our solution. Finally, we discuss about the IANA port number assignments for the TCP and UDP protocols and how we utilize this assignment scheme to recognize services inside and outside the firewall.
A. Firewall
Firewalls examine packets passing through them, and depending on the configuration specified by the administrators, decide which packets to allow to pass and which packets to drop. There are basically two types of firewalls, Stateless and Stateful. A stateless firewall examines each packet in isolation, and decides whether to accept or drop the packet independent of other packets passing through the firewall. On the other hand, a stateful firewall can track connections and states, and can relate packets to existing connections. When the firewall observes a connection request, it accepts or rejects the packet according to the defined rules. If the packet is accepted and the destination server responds with an established connection, then the firewall keeps track of the connection and accepts subsequent packets related to that connection. On the other hand if the firewall observes a packet that is not associated with any currently established connection, then it drops that packet. Because of this, one can simply specify which IP addresses and ports to allow incoming or outbound connections. For this advantage, stateful firewalls are gradually replacing stateless firewalls. More information on stateful and stateless firewalls can be found in Henmi (2006) , and an analysis of the stateful firewall model can be found in Gouda & Liu (2005) . In this paper, we focus on stateful firewalls. However, our algorithm will be equally effective for stateless firewalls.
Another important concept related to firewalls is packet logging. A firewall can be instructed to maintain a log of every packet, or packets matching some criteria, that passes through it. The log file can also be annotated, for example to show which packets were dropped. In this study, we examine such log files and attempt to regenerate the effective rules. It is vital for our algorithm to function properly that each and every packet is logged and the dropped packets are clearly marked. Though our algorithm needs every packet logged, but our experiments with real life data in Sec. V-D showed that only 10% of one day's log was sufficient for 99.66% accuracy. This suggests that we do not need to keep all packets for a long period of time. Thus we can simply use a certain number of packets to regenerate the initial set of rules, and then periodically we can use the log file up to that point to merge with the previously generated rules. Whether the logs should be retained can be adopted to the organization's capacity to retain logs. If the capacity is high then the log can be retained over long periods of time as desired, and if the capacity is low, then it has to be removed more frequently. Doing this process more frequently has the advantage of being more up-to-date in terms of current traffic patterns and earlier warning if some defect is in the firewall implementation.
B. TCP Handshaking
The TCP protocol employs a three way handshaking. When a client wants to connect with a server, it sends a connection establishment packet to the server. This packet has the SYN flag set. When the server gets this packet it sends back the response with the SYN and ACK flags set. Finally, after getting this response from the server, the client sends the acknowledgment packet to the server with the ACK flag set. Once the connection is established in this way, normal data transfer begins between the client and the server. After the data transfer has been completed, the connection is closed. More details on the protocol can be found in Black (1998) .
In our study we take advantage of the three way handshaking during connection establishment to detect a server. By examining the initial exchange, we can detect both the IP address and the port number of the server. Briefly, if we observe a packet with both SYN and ACK flags set, we can conclude the it is a response from a server that has accepted a connection request. This would imply that the firewall is allowing traffic to this server on this port. More details will be discussed in Section IV.
C. TCP/UDP Port Numbers
The TCP and UDP protocols use port numbers in the range 0 -65535. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) recommends globally-unique names and numbers for use in TCP and UDP. According to IANA recommendation (IAN 2009), the port numbers are divided into three groups, the Well Known Ports (0 -1023), the Registered Ports (1024 -49151), and the Dynamic and/or Private Ports (49152 -65535).
The well known ports are used exclusively for offering various well known services. Therefore, if such a port number is observed then the packet must be coming from or going to a server. If the source port of the packet is in the range of the well known ports, then it is coming from a server. The packet is going to a server if the destination port is in this range. So by observing the port number we can easily identify the server IP and the service port number.
The Dynamic and/or Private ports are exclusively use by the client. So if such a port number is observed as a source port, then the packet must have originated from a client. Similarly, if such a port number appears in the destination port then the packet must be going to a client.
The Registered ports can be used by both the server and the client. Thus, the appearance of such a port number does not carry any useful information about the server or the client.
In our study we identify the servers by checking if the source or destination port falls in the the well known port range. We also identify the clients by checking if the source or destination port falls in the the dynamic and/or private port range. In our research if some packets do not fall into either well-known or dynamic port range, we apply additional aggregating heuristics. If we find packets coming in from different IP address and ports to a specific IP address and port pair, then that IP address is providing a service at that port. Conversely, if we find different outgoing accepted primitive rules that originate from the same IP address and goes to different IP addresses at the same destination port, then we conclude that the firewall is allowing internal hosts to access external services on this port.
D. Decaying and Dominant Rules
A firewall rule is said to be decaying if this rule is not activated very frequently or if the rule is not triggered at all. Firewall log file gives the information about the packets traversing the network within a given period of time. By analyzing the firewall log our rule regeneration algorithm generates the effective firewall rules with the count of how many times each rule was activated. From this frequency we can find the dominant and decaying rules. The rule which have the highest frequency is the dominant rule and the rule which have least frequency is the decaying rule. From this one can order the generated or original rules according to the decreasing order of the frequency and can come up with effective and up-to-date firewall rule set.
If a rule is not triggered over a certain period time there will be no entry in the log file for this rule and our algorithm will not generate this rule. So by comparing the generated rules and the original rules we also can find these decaying rules in the original rules which have zero frequency over a sufficiently long period of time. By discovering this kind of rules a network administrator can decide whether to keep these rules or not. But if these rules are kept in the firewall rules, they should come after all the frequently triggered rules.
In our study we generate the decaying and dominant rule by calculating their frequency in our primitive rule generation algorithm in Section IV-A and from this information we can find the frequencies of the rules generated by the subsequent algorithms.
IV. ALGORITHM
In this section, we present our algorithm for analyzing the effective firewall rules from the firewall log files. Our algorithm is in two parts -in the first part, described in Section IV-A, using the Mining firewall Log using Frequency (MLF) technique we generate primitive rules, i.e., unique tuples of source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, direction, protocol, SYN, ACK and action, from the raw firewall log files. In the second part, described in Section IV-B, we take the primitive rules generated by MLF and based on their characteristics, regenerate the firewall rules. This rules will be presented to the administrator of the network for comparison and validation. Then in Section IV-C we discuss how we can adapt this algorithm to streaming processing and we discuss the complexity of the algorithm in Section IV-D.
A. Mining firewall Log using Frequency (MLF)
We have developed a simple and efficient traffic mining algorithm using simple frequency -Mining firewall Log using Frequency (MLF). The MLF algorithm reads each line of the firewall log file, extracts the attributes for each log record, counts its occurrence, and outputs the count for each unique combination of these attributevalues (see Algorithm 1). The frequency of each rule discovered is kept and summed up for the rules which are being aggregated. Thus each log record of a packet in a firewall log file is processed to create a primitive rule. Here primitive rule is a specific firewall policy rule where all of its attributes are substantiated or specified with its value being observed in firewall log file. Thus the initial step in the process of extracting the attributes of a packet for each log record is to discover and generate its corresponding primitive firewall rule, with a set of the substantiated attributes of (1) Direction (such as incoming or outgoing packet), (2) Protocol (such as TCP or UDP), (3) Source IP, (4) Source port, (5) Destination IP, (6) Destination port, (7) SYN (if the SYN flag is set), (8) ACK (if the ACK flag is set), and (9) Action (to accept or reject for a packet satisfying these attributes).
Algorithm 1 Mining Firewall Log Using Frequency (MLF)
Input: List of records from Log, recordList. Output: table of frequencies for all unique rules, f reqT able rule, integer . 1: f reqT able ← φ 2: for all record ∈ recordList do 3:
Increment the count of record in f reqT able 5:
Add record to f reqT able and set count of record in f reqT able to 1 7: end if 8: end for 9: return f reqT able
B. Firewall Rules Regeneration (FRR)
The Firewall Rules Regeneration, or FRR algorithm, takes as input the list of primitive rules generated by MLF algorithm and applies several techniques to regenerate the firewall rules. The complete algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2. But first we describe the techniques used in the FRR algorithm. In the FRR algorithm, we first analyze the accepting primitive rules to generate the accept rules of the firewall. This is done in Sections IV-B1, IV-B2 and IV-B3. Then we analyze the rejecting primitive rules to generate the reject rules of the firewall in Section IV-B4. In each step, the frequency of each generated rule is calculated from the frequencies generated by Algorithm 1, MLF. The output of the algorithm is the complete effective firewall rules along with their frequencies.
Algorithm 2 presents the overall firewall rule generation process. It takes as input the list of primitive rules generated by Algorithm 1, MLF, and returns the list of firewall rules generated by the subprocesses. It initializes an empty list of firewall rules, F , in line 1, then successively calls the algorithm 3, 4, 5 and 6 on lines 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. It then returns the populated list F . We also use a convenience procedure, AddRule, that is used by the subsequent algorithms to add a rule to the firewall rule list and delete all primitive rules from the primitive rules list that match with the new firewall rule.
Algorithm 2 Firewall Rules Regeneration (FRR)
Input: list of primitive rules, P . Output: list of firewall rules,
1) Identification of TCP Services (ITS):
We identify the TCP servers using the TCP connection establishment handshake characteristics. Using the concept described in Section III-B, we first consider the outgoing primitive rules that has both SYN and ACK flags set and that has been accepted by the firewall. Recall that when a server accepts a connection request, it sends back a packet with both SYN and ACK bits set to the client. Thus, the existence of this packet in the log indicates that (1) the firewall has allowed a client to send a connection request packet to the port, and (2) there is indeed a server listening to that port. Therefore, from such primitive rules we extract the source IP addresses and source ports, and make firewall rules allowing incoming connections to these IP address and port pairs. We then remove all incoming and outgoing primitive rules matching these generated rules from the primitive rules list. We can remove these packets since a stateful firewall usually automatically handles the packets related to an established connection and no separate rules are usually written to handle these packets. This simple rule correctly identifies each and every TCP service that allows incoming connections through the firewall, including those services being offered at non-standard port.
Similarly, we examine the outgoing primitive rules that have the SYN flag set and that has been accepted by the firewall. According to the concepts in Section III-B, these represents connection requests from machines inside the firewall to external servers. This implies that the firewall is allowing these external services to be accessed by the internal machines. Therefore we extract the destination port numbers from these primitive rules, and make firewall rules that allow internal machines to access these services. Then we remove all incoming and outgoing primitive rules matching these new rules from the primitive rules list.
In constructing the firewall rule, we have a choice to make when assigning the source IP address and source port number. In general, servers do not care for the source port number, and hence we can simply assign source port as *. However, the source IP address should be assigned with more care. We can follow a number of aggregation schemes here. If a very liberal approach is taken, the source IP address can be assigned *. Then the server will accept connection from anywhere. On the other hand, the most restrictive approach would be to put exactly the same IP address that appears in the primitive rule into the generated rule. But this will increase the number of rules too much since in the worst case it may generate one rule for each distinct IP address in the log file. Also, hosts that do not have a packet in the time period during which the log file was generated will be subsequently denied access. A good compromise is to aggregate the IP addresses in a controlled manner. If we find that the IP addresses are from the same subnet then we can put that subnet as the source IP address. Another approach can be putting the range of the IP addresses as the source IP address. The choice will be made by the administrator based on the needs and characteristics of his network. For simplicity, the examples in this paper assume the most liberal aggregation.
For example, suppose we have the primitive rules in Table I These concepts are implemented in Algorithm 3. It takes as input the list of primitive rules, P , and produces as output the list of firewall rules, F , generated by identifying the internal servers and external services. We start with an empty firewall rule list F in line 1. In line 2, we get the list of internal TCP servers as described previously and in lines 3 to 5 we add the corresponding firewall rules to the firewall rules list F . In line 6 we obtain the list of accessible TCP services and in lines 7 to 9 we add the corresponding firewall rules to the list F . Finally we return the populated list F .
Algorithm 3 Identification of TCP Services (ITS)
Input: list of primitive rules, P . Output: list of firewall rules, F . 1: F ← φ /* Identify internal servers using SYN-ACK method */ 2: A ← {(r.src ip, r.src port) |r ∈ P and r.dir = out and r.proto = tcp and r.syn = true and r.ack = true and r.action = accept} 3: for all (x, y) ∈ A do 4:
AddRule( in, tcp, * , * , x, y, accept , F, P ) 5: end for /* Identify external services using SYN-ACK method */ 6: A ← {r.dst port|r ∈ P and r.dir = out and r.proto = tcp and r.syn = true and r.ack = f alse and r.action = accept} 7: for all y ∈ A do 8:
AddRule( out, tcp, * , * , * , y, accept , F, P ) 9: end for 10: return F
2) Identification of Servers by Port Ranges (SPR):
Since all the TCP servers will have been handled in the previous step, in this step we concentrate on the other protocol that uses port numbers, namely, UDP. In a network where the IANA port number assignments are honored, the UDP servers can identified on the basis of the port number ranges as follows.
As described in Section III-C, a port number less than 1024 is always a server port. We can identify servers inside and outside the firewall using this information. We first consider the incoming primitive rules that have destination port less than 1024 and that has been accepted by the firewall. These imply that there are servers inside the firewall that offer services on these ports and the firewall allows external hosts to access these services. Therefore, we extract the destination IP addresses and port numbers and make firewall rules that allow external hosts to access these services. Then we delete those primitive rules that match these new rules.
Conversely, when we consider the outgoing accepted primitive rules that has destination port number less than 1024, we know that the firewall is allowing internal machines to access these services on the outside. Thus we extract the destination ports of these primitive rules, and write firewall rules that allow the internal hosts to access these services and we delete all incoming and outgoing primitive rules matching these new rules.
Another information that we can utilize is the dynamic and/or private port numbers range, i.e., port numbers greater than or equal to 49152. As described in Section III-C, if we observe source port numbers in this range, we can infer that these packets are coming from client machines and going to servers. Thus, we can extract the destination IP addresses and port numbers from accepted incoming primitive rules with source port numbers less than or equal to 49152, and make firewall rules that allow external hosts to access these services. Also we can extract the destination ports from accepted outgoing primitive rules with source port numbers in the dynamic range and make firewall rules that allow traffic to these services. Then we need to delete all incoming and outgoing primitive rules matching these rules. These two heuristics are useful for the connectionless UDP protocol.
For example, if we have the primitive rules as in Table II , then from the first two rows we can conclude that 10.69.160.1 is offering a UDP service at port 53 since 53 ≤ 1023. So we construct a rule in, udp, * , * , 10.69.160.1, 53, accept to allow external hosts to access this service and delete the corresponding primitive rules. From the third and fourth rows, we can say that 10.178.200.168 is offering a UDP service on port 7831 since we have a packet coming to port 7831 of host 10.178.200.168 with source port in dynamic range. So we construct a rule in, udp, * , * , 10.178.200.168, 7831, accept and delete the corresponding primitive rules.
These concepts are implemented in Algorithm 4. It takes as input the list of primitive rules, P , and produces as output the list of firewall rules, F , generated by identifying the internal servers and external services using the port range information. We start with an empty firewall rule list F in line 1. In line 2, we get the list of internal servers using well known ports range as described previously and in lines 3 to 5 we add the corresponding firewall rules to the firewall rules list F . In line 6 we obtain the list of accessible services using the well known ports range and in lines 7 to 9 we add the corresponding firewall rules to the list F .
Next we generate the firewall rules using the dynamic ports range. In line 10, we get the list of internal servers using dynamic ports range as described previously and in lines 11 to 13 we add the corresponding firewall rules to the firewall rules list F . In line 14 we obtain the list of accessible services using the dynamic ports range and in lines 15 to 17 we add the corresponding firewall rules to the list F . Finally we return the populated list F .
3) Aggregation of Residual Primitive Rules (RPR):
If any primitive rules are left behind after applying the methods in Sections IV-B1 and IV-B2, we apply aggregation to identify servers inside and outside of the firewall. These traffic include the non-port-based protocols like ICMP and UDP traffic that have a port number in the registered port range at both the client and the server end, for example, VoIP traffic. The basic concept is that if we find packets coming in from different IP address and ports to a specific IP address and port pair, then that IP address is providing a service at that port. Thus, we examine the incoming accepted primitive rules and find out the destination IP address and port pairs that have packets coming from different source IP addresses and ports. Then we write firewall rules allowing external traffic destined for these servers and remove all the incoming AddRule( in, p, * , * , x, y, accept , F, P ) 5: end for /* Identify external services by well known ports */ 6: A ← {(r.proto, r.dst port) |r ∈ P and r.dir = out and r.dst port ≤ 1023 and r.action = accept} 7: for all (p, y) ∈ A do 8:
AddRule( out, p, * , * , * , y, accept , F, P ) 9: end for /* Identify internal servers by dynamic ports */ 10: A ← {(r.proto, r.src ip, r.src port) |r ∈ P and r.dir = out and r.dst port ≥ 49152 and r.action = accept} 11: for all (p, x, y) ∈ A do
12:
AddRule( in, p, * , * , x, y, accept , F, P ) 13: end for /* Identify external services by dynamic ports */ 14: A ← {(r.proto, r.dst port) |r ∈ P and r.dir = out and r.src port ≥ 49152 and r.action = accept} 15: for all (p, y) ∈ A do 16: AddRule( out, p, * , * , * , y, accept , F, P ) 17: end for 18: return F and outgoing primitive rules matching these generated rules.
Conversely, if we find different outgoing accepted primitive rules that originate from the same IP address and goes to different IP addresses at the same destination port, then we conclude that the firewall is allowing internal hosts to access external services on this port. We write the corresponding firewall rules allowing outgoing connections through these ports and delete the corresponding primitive rules.
At the end, if some accepted primitive rule is still left over, we insert them unmodified at the end of the firewall rules. This ensures that all the packets that were accepted by the original firewall are also accepted by the generated rules.
For example, if we have the primitive rules as in Table III Algorithm 5 implements these concepts. It takes as input the list of primitive rules, P , and produces as output the list of firewall rules, F , generated by identifying the internal servers and external services by aggregating primitive rules. We start with an empty firewall rule list F in line 1. In line 2, we get the list of accepted outgoing primitive rules. If on line 4 we can get a primitive rule that matches this rule as described previously, then we modify the rule in line 6 so that the server can be accessed from outside. We add the rule to the firewall rules list F in line 8.
In line 10, we get the list of accepted incoming primitive rules. If on line 12 we can get a primitive rule that matches this rule as described previously, then we modify the rule in line 14 so that the internal hosts can access these outside services. We add the rule to the firewall rules list F in line 16. Finally we return the populated list F .
Algorithm 5 Aggregation of Residual Primitive Rules (RPR)
Input: list of primitive rules, P . Output: list of firewall rules, F . 1: F ← φ /* Identify internal servers by aggregation */ 2: A ← {r|r ∈ P and r.dir = out and r.action = accept} 3: for all r ∈ A do 4: B = {s|s ∈ P, and s and r differ only in dst ip and dst port} AddRule(r, F, P ) 9: end for /* Identify external services by aggregation */ 10: A ← {r|r ∈ P and r.dir = in and r.action = accept} 11: for all r ∈ A do 12: B = {s|s ∈ P, and s and r differ only in src ip and dst port} AddRule(r, F, P ) 17: end for 18: return F
4) Rejection Rule Generation (RRG):
Finally we deal with the rejected primitive rules after finishing all the accepted primitive rules. We add the default incoming and outgoing reject rules at the end of the rules generated so far. Then, we take each rejected primitive rule in turn and find the first rule among the generated rules that match the criteria. If the matching rule is also reject, then we simply delete the primitive rule, and if the matching rule is actually accept, then we place the primitive rule before the matching rule.
To detect a black listed IP we followed the following heuristic. When an incoming packet gets rejected by the firewall there are mainly three reasons for which the packet got rejected. First, the packet may be destined for a service not offered by the network. Second, the packet may be malformed. Third, the packet may be generated from a host which is marked as Black Listed in the original firewall rules. We are using some heuristics so that we can detect which category the rejected packet actually falls in. As we first handle all accepted packet so we knew a list of services which are offered by the network. So when a packet got rejected we first take the destination IP and port from the packet and search in the generated services list. If the IP and port are not in our service list then the packet actually tried to access a service not offered by the network and we simply ignore this packet because this type of packet will always get rejected by the default rejection rule of the firewall. If we find that the packet was destined for an offered service but got rejected then it may for the other two causes. We store the packet's source IP, destination IP and destination port in a list to investigate further. If we observe rejection for another packet from that IP to the same destination IP and port then we list the source IP in the black list, and generate a rule so that this IP cannot access the specified service which it was going to access.
We implement these concepts in Algorithm 6. It takes as input the list of primitive rules, P , and the list of firewall rules generated so far, F . It begins by appending the default reject rules in, any, * , * , * , * , reject and out, any, * , * , * , * , reject to F in lines 1 and 2. Then it takes each rejecting primitive rule r and finds the existing generated firewall rule s in F that matches r in line 4. If s and r has the different actions, we insert r before s in F in line 6. Then we delete r from P in line 8. Finally, the firewall rule list F is returned.
Algorithm 6 Rejection Rule Generation (RRG)
Input: list of primitive rules, P , list of firewall rules, F . Output: list of firewall rules, F . 1: Add rule in, any, * , * , * , * , reject to F 2: Add rule out, any, * , * , * , * , reject to F 3: for all r ∈ P with r.action = reject do 4:
Find s ∈ F that matches r Remove r from P 9: end for 10: return F
C. Streaming Mode Processing
As discussed in Section III-A, it may be desirable to process the log file data in a streaming fashion. Processing the log files as stream is useful for two reasons. First, since the accuracy of the regenerated rules improve with the amount of log data seen by the algorithm, running the algorithm in streaming mode will allow it to find progressively better regenerated rules. Second, running the algorithm in streaming mode reduces the amount of log data that has to be stored at any given moment for the algorithm. Third, running the algorithm in streaming mode allows to constantly monitor if the current rule set is up-to-date with the current traffic patterns and also to constantly monitor the device for malfunction or latent defects in implementations. For these reasons, we present the following modifications that would allow the algorithm to run in streaming mode.
In streaming mode processing, periodic snapshots of traffic is taken, and combined with previously generated rules. This can be achieved with a very minor modification of Algorithm 2. The packets in the current snapshot will be used to generate the primitive rules as usual. Then in Algorithm 2, in line 1, the firewall rule set F will be initialized with the previously generated rule set. If, after some run of the algorithm, the administrator decides to change some or all of the original firewall rules, the new rule set can be applied to the primitive rule set F to generate the new values of the Action files. No other modification of the algorithm is necessary, the rest of the algorithm will progress correctly.
D. Complexity of Algorithm
In this section we discuss the running time of our rule generation algorithm. The first step of this algorithm is to construct the primitive rules from the firewall log file. During this we have to access all the packets to generate the primitive rules. So the running time of this step is O(n) where n is the size of the log file.
After generating primitive rules, we have to process them to regenerate the firewall rules. In this step we first consider only those primitive rules which are accepted by the firewall policy. Let the size of the accepted primitive rules be m. Usually m is much smaller than n. We apply our heuristics on these primitive rules to find out the internal and outgoing servers. After detecting a server we insert the corresponding rule allowing traffic to it into the regenerated rule list and delete those primitive rules which match the rule. So the size of the primitive rules are decreasing in the process of generating firewall rules. The overall worst case running time of this step is O(m 2 ). However, if the algorithm is implemented in database, with application of suitable indexing scheme, like B + -tree indexing, can reduce this time to O(m log m). If all the primitive rules can be loaded to memory for in-memory processing, then use of a suitable data structure, like hash table, can reduce this time even further to linear, i.e., O(m).
After processing all the accepted primitive rules we have found a accepting firewall rule set. Let the size of the firewall rules be p. In worst case p can be equal to m, but it is really unrealistic and in real case p is much smaller than m. Now we process the primitive rules whose action is reject. Let the size of rejected primitive rules be r. We have to match all the rejected primitive rules with the generated rules one by one to check whether this rejecting primitive rule has a conflict with the generated rule. In the worst case, it does not match with any accepting generated rule and falls into the default reject rule. In this case it has to be compared p times. So the time complexity for this operation is O(pr). So the overall worst case time complexity of the complete algorithm is O(n + m 2 + pr), or O(n 2 ) since m, p and r are O(n). However, this upper bound is very unlikely to occur. In Wool (2004) , the author collected 37 firewall rule sets from organizations in the telecommunications, financial, energy, media, automotive, and health care market segments as well as from research labs, academic institutions, and network security consulting firms. The number of rules varied from 5 to 2671, the average number of rules per policy was 144. However in a typical log file there can be millions of packets. This shows that in practice, we are likely to have the algorithm run in O(n) time.
V. EXPERIMENTS
The effectiveness of our algorithm depends upon how accurately our algorithm regenerates the effective firewall rules. Thus the evaluation of our algorithms focuses on determining the effectiveness of the rule regeneration process. We present the evaluation of the rule generation algorithm from three different perspectives. First, we show the results from running our algorithms on real network traffic data collected over two days. Second, we show the accuracy results and study how much data is needed to achieve a reasonable level of accuracy by running our algorithm on synthetic data. Third, we analyze how much time is needed by our implementation of the algorithm.
Since we are regenerating the rules in order to evaluate the original rule set, we cannot compare the generated rules with the original rules. Rather, we use the log file itself to validate the accuracy of the generated rules. We divide the log files into two parts -training set and test set. We run our algorithm on the training set to generate the effective rules, and then apply these rules on the packets in the test set and collect statistics on how many times the decision of the generated rules match the decision of the actual firewall. This gives us the measure of how accurately our algorithm can model the actual firewall's actions. Also, using this accuracy measure, we can compare rules regenerated from different amounts of data. The effect of other factors on accuracy, like number of hosts and number of rules were studied by using synthetically generated data. All our experiments were run in an 2.8GHz Intel Pentium-D CPU workstation with 3.5GB system memory running Fedora Core 6 Linux.
A. Datasets
We have used both real and synthetic data in our experiments. The following sections discuss how the real data was collected and how the synthetic data was generated.
1) Real Data:
The real data consists of two genuine firewall log files of one day each, generated by Linux iptables, collected from a personal web server hosting a gaming site. This is a stateful firewall, meaning that as discussed in III-A, it can track established connections and handle packets related to the established connections by itself. The first day's log file contains record of 1.3 million packets, and the second day's log file contains records of 1.6 million packets. From the first day's log, 6060 lines were removed due to being malformed, and from the second day's log, 23639 lines were removed for the same reason. The removal was done automatically using a set of patterns that occur most commonly in malformed log input, tcp, * , * , * , 20, accept 0.00% 8.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 25, accept 0.0065% 9.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 143, accept 0.00% 10.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 993, accept 0.00% 11.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 53, accept 0.00% 12.
input, udp, * , * , * , 53, accept 0.0013% 13.
input, icmp, * , * , * , 0, accept 0.01189% 14.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 10000, accept 0.00056% 15.
input, udp, * , * , * , 10000, accept 0.00% 16.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 4110, accept 0.00% 17.
input, any, * , * , * , * , reject 0.29971% 18.
output, any, 127.0.0.1, * , 127.0.0.1, * , accept 0.00344% 19.
output, any, * , * , * , * , accept 8.30994%
entries, for example two or more source ports or destination ports in the same entry, incomplete entry, zero source port for TCP/UDP packets, etc. Out of these 2.9 million packets, 1.8 million packets were handled by the stateful firewall as packets related some already established connection. The rest 1.1 million packets were handled by the firewall rules, and these packets represent the incoming and outgoing connection requests. Therefore, these packets are our main concern. The original firewall rules, as well as the percentages of connection packets that they match, are given in Table IV . It has been converted from Linux iptable format to our rule format for ease of understanding and comparison, and IP addresses have been changed to protect privacy where necessary.
2) Synthetic Data:
We have generated synthetic data in two steps. First, we have generated random network configurations. Second, we have generated packets from these configurations. Now we discuss these two steps in detail. Table V shows the characteristics of the network configurations. For the experiment to test performance, we have generated 100 random network configurations that all have this same characteristics. We have arbitrarily chosen the subnet inside the firewall to be 129.110.96.0. In each random configuration, we have generated up to 100 random IP addresses in this subnet. We have also generated up to 1000 random remote IP addresses outside the firewall, out of them we have randomly chosen up to 100 as servers. We also randomly generated 25 remote services that these servers will offer that can be accessed by the machines inside the firewall. Each server offers a random number of services out of these 25 services. Out of them 80% of them are TCP services and 20% of them are UDP services. From the IP addresses inside the firewall we have randomly chosen up to 30% as servers and assigned services to them in the same way as the remote servers. For each configuration we have also generated 5 blacklisted IP addresses. All traffic to and from these blacklisted IP addresses are rejected. For the experiment to test the accuracy, the number of local hosts were varied from 1 to up to 100, and the number of remote hosts were taken from 500 to 1000. The number of blacklisted IP addresses was reduced to 5. All the other numbers were calculated as above.
For each random network configuration we have generated random traffic log files. The number of conversations per log file was 25, 000. We have assigned the protocols to the conversations according to the probability distribution in Table VI . This distribution was taken as the same distribution of the protocols in our real data. The action of the conversations were chosen according to the probability distribution described in Table VII . 50% of the conversations were incoming.
B. Implementation
Both the Mining firewall Log using Frequency (MLF) algorithm in Section IV-A and the Firewall Rules Regeneration (FRR) algorithm in Section IV-B has been implemented and tested. First we describe how we implemented the MLF algorithm in Section V-B1 and then we discuss the implementation details of the FRR algorithm in Section V-B2.
1) Implementing MLF:
We have implemented the MLF algorithm to work on the Linux operating system iptables firewall log. The iptables firewall log file provides a rich set of data about the packets it handles. Each line contains information of one packet. Following is an example of the log of a packet: Nov 4 04:57:01 ip-10-178-200-168 kernel: IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:30:1b:b9:a2:15:00:0b:fc:a0:08:00:08:00 SRC=152. 135.235.188 DST=10.178.200 .168 LEN=40 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=51 ID=51571 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=44234 DPT=80 WINDOW=11040 RES=0x00 ACK URGP=0 It shows the time stamp, direction, protocol, source and destination MAC addresses, IP addresses, port numbers and some other information. For TCP protocol, it also shows if the SYN and ACK flags are set. For example, this packet is inbound, using TCP protocol, coming from port number 44234 of IP address 152.135.235.188, going to port number 80 of IP address 10.178.200.168, and it has the ACK flag set. In implementing the MLF algorithm, we parse the log file and extract these information about the packets. Line 2 has been implemented in this way -it parses the firewall log file line by line and returns primitive rules as record of format { direction, protocol, source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, SYN, ACK, action }. For each record found in line 2, it is looked up in line 3, if it exists, the corresponding count is incremented and if it cannot be found then it is inserted into f reqT able with a count of 1. When all the packets have been processed, f reqT able contains all the primitive rules and their frequency.
2) Implementing FRR: We have implemented the Firewall Rules Regeneration (FRR) algorithm to work on the primitive rules generated in previous Section V-B1.
Algorithms 3, 4 and 5 follow the same structure. To get the firewall rules according to these algorithms we select the primitive rules related to the condition of the algorithm. After getting the primitive rules we have traversed the rules to generate the corresponding firewall rules. When we have found the rules, we have removed the primitive rules that matches the corresponding firewall rules because these will not be needed any further.
After getting the accepted rules we have processed the rejected packets by algorithm 6 to generate the rejected rules for the firewall. First we have inserted two universal reject rules at the end of our generated firewall rule list. We have done this because the accepted rules of the firewall define which packets are allowed by the firewall and the remaining packets must be rejected by the firewall. First we have obtained the internal services list from the accepted firewall rule list. Then we select those incoming rejected rules which wanted to access non-existing internal services. We have removed these packets because they will be rejected by the universal reject rules. Then, we delete those primitive rules that have protocol TCP, direction incoming and SYN flag unset. We remove these because these were rejected because of not meeting the stateful criteria. Removing them leaves us with only rejected connection requests. Then we take each rejected primitive rule and search for matching accepting firewall rule. If we find a match then we put the rejected rule before the matching accepting rule. Then we have deleted the corresponding rejected primitive rules that matched with the rejected rule.
C. Experiment With Real Data
In our experiment with the real data, after getting the logs we have run our program to extract the effective firewall rules from the log files. Then we have compared our generated rules with the original rules. The generated rules are shown in Table VIII .
By comparing the generated rule set with the original rule set, we make the following comments:
• Undefined Rules: From the generated rule set, the rules 22, 18, 25, 26, 27 and 28 are not defined explicitly in the original rule set. However their generation indicates that there are packets that match this rule and this should be checked by the administrator.
• Decaying Rules: From the original rule set, the rules 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, 15 and 16 does not appear in the generated rule set. The reason is there were no packets corresponding to these rules. It may indicate that these rules are decaying. Since these rules do not conflict with any other rule, the administrator may push them down in the order to allow the more dominant rules to appear first.
• Reordering Rules: We can see from Table IV that 84.95% of all packets match rule 4. Therefore this is a very dominating rule, and should be placed at the top of the firewall rules. In fact, if the rules are sorted in descending order of frequency, then the performance of the firewall will be optimized. However, one must be careful in reordering the rules to ensure that no anomalies or conflicts arise in the rules (Al-Shaer & Hamed 2003) . For example, based on the frequencies obtained in this experiment, the rules may be reordered as shown in Table IX . Note that rule 17 is kept at the bottom of the input rules since otherwise it would shadow the other rules.
• Restrictive Rules: The generated rules are more restrictive than the original rules. In the original rule set, the incoming output, tcp, * , * , * , 25, accept 8.
output, tcp, * , * , * , 37, accept 9.
output, tcp, * , * , * , 80, accept 10.
output, tcp, * , * , * , 443, accept 11.
output, tcp, * , * , * , 783, accept 12.
output, tcp, * , * , * , 5432, accept 13.
output, tcp, * , * , * , 9876, accept 14.
input, tcp, * , * , 127.0.0. input, tcp, 196.25.255.218, 62721, 10.178.200.168, 32767, accept 26. input, tcp, 207.224.167.182, 2618, 10.178.200.168, 7520, accept 27. input, tcp, 209.55.111.83, 3564, 10.178.200.168, 1919, accept 28. input, tcp, 71.188.155.81, 61971, 10.178.200.168, 64752 , accept 29.
input, * , * , * , * , * , reject 30.
output, * , * , * , * , * , reject 
1.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 80, accept 84.95% 2.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 22, accept 3.20% 3.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 443, accept 3.21% 4.
input, icmp, * , * , * , 0, accept 0.012% 5.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 25, accept 0.0065% 6.
input, any, 127.0.0.1, * , 127.0.0.1, * , accept 0.0034% 7.
input, udp, * , * , * , 53, accept 0.0013% 8.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 10000, accept 0.00056% 9.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 21, accept 0.00037% 10.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 9999, accept 0.00% 11.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 20, accept 0.00% 12.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 143, accept 0.00% 13.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 993, accept 0.00% 14.
input, tcp, * , * , * , 53, accept 0.00% 15.
output, any, * , * , * , * , accept 8.31%
accept rules allow incoming traffic to any IP address inside the firewall. On the other hand, the generated incoming accept rules allow incoming traffic only to actual servers inside the firewall. Similarly, the outgoing accept rules in the original rule set allow outgoing connection through any port (see rule 19). In contrast, the generated rule set only allow traffic to services actually accessed. Unless there is any explicit reason for allowing incoming traffic in such unrestricted manner, the administrator should apply the restriction suggested by the generated rules.
D. Experiments for Accuracy and Effect of Partial Data
In this section we discuss why we experimented with partial data, how we performed the experiment and what results we obtained.
1) Motivation:
Since network packets are continuously flowing, the log files are always changing. To get the complete picture of the traffic pattern over a long period of time may be infeasible in terms of time or storage space. Thus it is more feasible to take periodic snapshots, generate rules, and combine with the previously generated rules. The period and the snapshot size has to be determined based on the traffic volume, load and trend. Therefore, it is interesting to test how much data is required to get an accurate description of the rules. However, the definition of accuracy will be important here. If the log does not contain packets corresponding to a rule, the algorithm can never generate it. We can see an example of this in Section V-C where 8 rules from the original rule set has not been generated. Using sampled data instead of complete data, theoretically there are two possible cases whereby the generated rules may differ from the original rules. First, if packets matching an accepting rule do not appear in the sample, the accepting rule will not be generated. Second, if packets matching a rejecting rule do not appear in the sample, the rejecting rule will not be generated by the algorithm. Therefore if rules are observed that appear in the original rule set but do not appear in the generated rule set, they can be identified as decaying rules. Subject to organization policy and practice, these rules can be moved lower in the order, or even removed altogether. Since we provide frequency counts for each original rule as part of the decaying-dominant rule detection process, it can be easily determined whether the sample contains packets matching all the rules in the original rules, and the administrator can vary the sample size to find a subset that can provide a fair representation of packets matching the original rules.
2) Method: To test how much data is needed to get a good model, we split the log files into two parts. The first part is the training set and the second part is the test set. We generate the firewall rules from the training set and then classify the packets in the test set using the generated rules and observe how many packets were classified accurately, i.e., in the same way as the original firewall. We have tested the accuracy by splitting the training log file into different sizes. However the test set was always the last 10% of the data. The size of the training set was varied from 10% to 90% in steps of 10%, always choosing the latest packets. Thus we can compare the performance of all the training sets of different sizes on the same test set and compare their performances fairly. For each of the training sizes, we have used the same implementation of the algorithm as described in Section V-B to generate the firewall rules from the training set. To test accuracy we first generated the primitive rules from the test set. Then we used generated firewall rules from the training set to classify the primitive rules from the test set and compute accuracy using the method described in the following section.
3) Accuracy Measure: We test the accuracy of the generated rules by checking whether the generated rules can classify the packets in the log file in the same way as the original firewall. This is done by applying the regenerated firewall rules on the packets in the test set. First the packets in the test set are converted to primitive rules. Second, each primitive rule is tested against the generated firewall rules. If the decision from the regenerated rules match the decision from the original rules, we add the frequency of the primitive rule to the correctly classified packet count, otherwise we add the frequency to the incorrectly classified packet count. Then the accuracy is found by dividing the number of correctly classified packets by the total frequency.
4) Results:
The results of this experiment is shown in Fig. 1 . As we can see from the graph, it does not need too much data to achieve a good representation of the rules. From this experiment we can see that from only 10% data we achieve 99.66% accuracy. This experiments show that the rule generation actually depends on how the internal and external servers are accessed by the clients. This algorithm can generate a full representation of active firewall rule by investigating only a small amount of data. Specifically, for TCP traffic, only the first connection establishment packets are needed. Though the algorithm is sensitive to data volume, i.e., its accuracy increases with higher volumes of data, it needs a very small amount of data to reach a very high accuracy. Thus this algorithm is suitable for implementation for online processing of streaming packet data as discussed in Section IV-C. Though we can generate the active firewall rule from only small amount of data but we need to run the algorithm in every interval to make sure that all the rules are activated by those packets and the generated rules stay up-to-date.
E. Experiment For Accuracy With Synthetic Data
We observed in Section V-D4 that the accuracy is positively correlated with data volume. We also want to study how is the accuracy affected by network size and firewall policy size, i.e., number of rules. As we don't have different log files for different network, so we generated synthetic data by considering the characteristic described in Section V-A2. After generating the synthetic data we checked how the accuracy of the generated firewall rules varied for different networks. Figure 2 shows the relation between the accuracy and number of packets used to regenerate the rules for different number of hosts in the network. We divided the data by varying the data size. We did our experiment for 100K, 200K, . . . , 1M packets to regenerate the rules and tested the generated rules on 100K packets, and showed the result. From the figure we can easily see that for any number of hosts in the network, increase in number of packets to regenerate the rules always increases the accuracy. It also shows that we can get a very high accuracy from only 100K packets.
We generated packets for different numbers of hosts in the networks. We divided this data for each host configuration by varying the data size as 100K, 200K, . . . , 1M packets to regenerate the rules and tested the generated rules on 100K packets. We did our experiment for each host configuration and showed the result in Figure 3 . From this figure we can easily see that there is no correlation between number of hosts and accuracy. But the figure shows that the accuracy depends with how many packets are used to regenerate the rules.
We generated packets for different numbers of rules in the firewall. We divided this data for each firewall configuration by varying the data size as 100K, 200K, . . . , 1M packets to regenerate the rules and tested the generated rules on 100K packets. We did our experiment for each firewall configuration and showed the result in Figure 4 . From this figure we can easily see that there is no correlation between number of rules and accuracy. But the figure reflects the general trend between the accuracy and how many packets are used to regenerate the rules.
F. Performance Test
In this section we discuss the results from experiments that measured the running times of the algorithm under different conditions involving both real and synthetic data. The goal of these experiments was to study the feasibility of applying this algorithm in a streaming manner as described in Section IV-C. When the algorithm is run on sampled data in batch mode, the actual running time of the algorithm is not so much of an issue. However, if the algorithm is run on a streaming manner, either for continuously monitoring if the policies are up-to-date or if any implementation defects can be found, the average running time needs to be known in order to choose the sample size and sampling interval. The experimental results in the following sections provide an insight into how to accomplish this.
1) Performance Test With Real Data:
We have applied the primitive rule extraction and firewall rule regeneration algorithms on the two real data sets described in Section V-A1. For each data set, the log file was divided into different sized chunks, using 10%, 20%, . . . , 100% of the log file. Then the primitive rule extraction and firewall rule regeneration algorithms were run on each chunk and the total execution times were recorded. Thus we were able to observe how the processing time varies with real life data for our algorithms. The results are shown in Figure 5 . From this figure, we can see that the time increases almost linearly with the number of packets. The highest time was for processing 1.6 million packets in only 114 seconds, which is very reasonable timing. Since we can achieve very high accuracies within this number of packets, it is apparent that we can apply this method for processing the data regularly on a preiodic basis.
To illustrate how this can be applied in real life, consider the following example: a OC-48/STM-16x/2.5G Sonet network connection delivers a payload of 2405.376 Mbit/s, which is equivalent to approximately to 700K packets per second 1 . Our method produced a packet processing rate of approximately 14K packets/s, which is approximately fifty times slower than the bandwidth. Then, we can divide the data stream into one second chunks and each 50 seconds we can take one second sample of the packets log to update the model constructed by the algorithm. In this way, we can construct the model of the firewall within a few minutes.
2) Performance Test With Synthetic Data: This experiment was run on synthetic data in order to observe the effect of the number of hosts and the number of rules on the running time of the algorithm. We applied our implementation of the algorithm as described in Section V-B to the traffic log files generated in Section V-A2. We divided this data for each network size by varying the data size as 100K, 200K, . . . , 1M packets to regenerate the rules and recorded the time taken by the program to generate the primitive rules and then regenerate the firewall rules from the primitive rules. The results show that there is a positive correlation between the log file size and running time in the Figure 7 . Though we have generated the rules for 10 different network sizes but as the figure shows, running times for different sized networks are almost similar for the same log file size. This figure shows that running time of our algorithm increases with the packet size. So this performance test also suggests us to regenerate the rules by using a small log file or breaking up large log files into small chunks. This approach will help us to achieve a good space and time complexity of the algorithm. Figure 6 shows how the network size affect the rule regeneration procedure. From this figure we can observe that the running time required to regenerate the rule file is very similar for different network sizes. It actually varies with the number of packets. If we increase the traffic volume to regenerate the rule file then the running time also increases.
G. Discussion on Results
The above experiments and results showed that from the network log file our algorithm can regenerate the effective firewall rules with high accuracy. This rule regeneration can help the administrator to find out if there is any error in the firewall implementation or if there is any anomaly in the original rule set. It also can help the administrator to maintain an up-to-date firewall rule set by considering the current traffic patterns. Our algorithms also achieve a high accuracy by considering only a small amount of data. The reason for this high accuracy is our set of heuristics described in Section III-A. For example, we need only a connection establishment packet for identifying TCP services, and for UDP we can generate the rules by checking the port number. Also we can infer from the results that the distribution of traffic in the test set followed the distribution of traffic in the training set. So if most of the firewall rules are activated within a short period of time, we can regenerate the rules by considering only a small amount of data. Because of this, we can divide the data in small intervals, apply our algorithm in each interval and can regenerate an up-to-date rule set in only a small amount of time.
From the performance tests we can see that the running time increases with the number of the packets, so division of the packet can reduce space and time complexity. How we can combine the results from the different chunks is described in Section IV-C. It is interesting to see that the execution time rises more slowly for the real data than it does for the synthetic data. This is because the synthetic data, being randomly generated, has more variation than the real data, and hence requires more time to process. Thus, our performance experiments support our claims made in Section IV-D.
From Section V-C, we can see that some of the regenerated rules are not similar to the original firewall rules for that network. After investigating of the log files we found that rules 18, 25, 26, 27 and 28 in the generated rule set in Section V-C are actually generated from only single packets. This may be a result of malformation in the log file. Malformations are very common in Linux iptables log files. This happens when two packets arrive too close to each other and as the kernel tries to write the log for both the packets, sometimes one packet's log partially overwrites the other packet's log. In our two day's log data, we had to remove 29699 lines from the log files due to malformation. Some examples of malformation are -two entries overlapped in the log file which result two source ports or destination ports in the single entry, incomplete entry, zero source port for TCP/ UDP packets and so on. After removing these malformed entries programmatically, there are still some very rare malformed entries that cause erroneous rules to be generated, but as these rules were generated from only one packet, though we report it but we can easily remove this from the rule file because of not sufficient evidence and we can also ignore the tcp packets which do not have connection establishment packets. And as there are no connection establishment packet for rules 25, 26, 27 and 28 so we got 0.0% packet coverage for those rules in our accuracy test.
One requirement for the algorithm is that all the packets need to be logged, which may strain the storage capacity of the system. There are two possible solutions to this issue. First, the algorithm can be run in streaming mode as described in Section IV-C so that instead of storing all the log files forever, only the current block of log data can be saved for running the algorithm (organizational data retention policy would determine how much log data is retained for how long for the firewall). This is the most widely used solution to the infinite data length problem for streaming data (for example see Wang et al. (2003) ). The second solution is to use industry standard traffic flow monitoring systems, for example devices that utilize the Cisco Netflow protocol 2 . In an enterprise network that can produce log data in overwhelming volumes, existing internal network monitoring devices can provide information on accepted traffics (since only packets not dropped by the firewall will be observed by these devices) and the firewall devices can provide logs of the dropped traffic. Combining these two data sources will provide precisely the data required by our algorithm, with minimal additional storage and processing overhead associated with log file collection. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
Firewall policy rules are one of most important elements and its management is a significant task for network security. A number of tools and techniques have been used to validate firewall implementation and keeping rules up-to-date. In our paper, we have presented a new process of validating firewall implementations and managing firewall policies, by regenerating effective firewall rules using heuristics and generalization. The advantages are, in summary, (1) to provide a capacity to reflect current trend of network traffic and thus to suggest effective firewall rules in real time from firewall log files, (2) to provide a report to analyze the traffic patterns for further analysis, firewall implementation validation and anomaly detection, and (3) to demonstrate that traffic mining based algorithms are not only feasible but also accurate and effective. In conclusion, traffic mining is shown to be not only one of the viable options but also a practical, effective and critical approach in firewall policy analysis, validation and optimization in real time.
For future research, current simple model of single firewall should be extended to (1) accommodate complex distributed networks with multiple firewalls and perimeter layers (Al-Shaer & Hamed 2004 , Ioannidis et al. 2000 employing various distinct firewall technologies available in different hardware and software platforms, (2) investigation and analysis on time-dependent statistical behavior of network traffic and policy rules, (3) the faulty and leaky network inside firewall perimeter (Smith & Bhattacharya 1998) , (4) adoption of 128-bit IP address of IPv6 (Deering & Hinden 1998) , and finally (5) other traffic and streaming data mining techniques and the clustering strategies including decision tree and the information theoretical approach. 
